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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
U.C.A. 41-6-44: (1)
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii)has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the
time of operation or actual physical control....
U. C. A. 41-6-1(22)
Motor vehicle means ever vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle
which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not
operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by human power and motorized
wheel chairs.
U.C.A. 41-6-1(56)
Vehicle means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or
may be transported or drawn upon the highways, except devices used exclusively
upon stationary rails or tracks.
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code
Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Defendant sought to dismiss the information after the conclusion of the State's
case. The basis being that the car was inoperable. The Court denied such motion. Does a
inoperable vehicle fall within the definition of the DUI statute?
2. Defendant submitted a jury instruction defining 'actual physical control' as
defined by prior appellate court decisions. The Court denied such an instruction and
created its own definition of 'actual physical control'. Defendant argues that such
instruction is contrary to the decision of this Court and in error.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant appeals from a jury trial conviction, a third degree
felony. He was found guilty of DUI—being in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while impaired by alcohol. The defendant was sentenced and committed
to prison for up to five (5) years.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The trial consisted of the State calling one witness, Utah Highway Patrol trooper
Robert C. Mitchell. No other witnesses were called.
The officer was dispatched at 9:08 p.m. on September 28, 2001 to a vehicle off
the side of the road. He arrived by the interstate exchange of 1-15 and University
Parkway in Orem, Utah at 9:15 p.m. T.53 L. 18/T.51 L. 17. He saw one car, a Chevrolet
Blazer 200 feet down in the drainage grade (a gorge area) with rocks of different sizes
about the Blazer. T. 54 L. 16. T. 55 L. 16. T. 54 L. 25. No other vehicles were present
except this Blazer. T 57 L. 9. The defendant was seated in the driver's seat. T57 L. 17.
The keys were on the front passenger side. T 59 L. 24. The car was stuck and would not
start T. 60 L. 15.
Field sobriety tests were given and the officer concluded that the defendant was
impaired by alcohol. He arrested the defendant at 9:50 p.m. T. 82 L. 18.
The tow truck was called and he had difficulty removing the car. He tried to get
in and move the car by its own self-propulsion but could not. He tried to start it but
couldn't. T. 83 L. 2. The car was inoperable. T 83 L. 18.
The car could only be remove by pulling it out by the two truck. T. 84 L. 10. The
car would not move on its own accord. T. 84 L. 22.
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Officer Mitchell did not see the Blazer go into the gorge. He did not know
who drove it there. T. 85 L. 23. The officer had no idea how long the Blazer had
been in the gorge. T 85 L. 20./T. 87 L. 9. His observations were limited to the 35
minutes between his arrival (9:15 p.m.) to the time of arrest ((9:50 p.m.). No
other information was available to determine how the car came to rest in the
gorge. The officer did not know how much the defendant had consumed or
when. T. 86 L. 7.
It was simply a case where the defendant is located in the driver seat of an
inoperable Chevrolet Blazer and the Blazer is stuck 200 feet down a gorge.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
An intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a
threat to the safety and welfare of the public. Such person poses a potential for harm.
Actual physical control statutes seek to prohibit this 'potential for harm' before
he/she gets in the car and attempts to drive.

Here no such danger existed, the vehicle

was inoperable.
The statutory definition of 'vehicle' requires the ability to move. Here, the
vehicle was stuck and would not start. It is only through the efforts of a tow truck that the
car was removed from the gorge.
Secondly, the State and the defense both requested a jury instruction based on
current Utah case law. Both were denied. The trial court gave a jury instruction, which
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an intoxicated person from driving but, as a preventative measure, the intoxicated driver
needs to be stopped before positioning himself to physically operate the car. The Courts
have concluded that an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor
vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public based on his/her potential for
harm. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P2nd 651 (Utah, 1982),
However, if a vehicle is not operable and no such danger exists. It is the
potential for harm that the legislature seeks to forbid. If the car is inoperable, no such
potential for harm exists.
Here the defendant could not operate the car and no danger existed that the car
was going to move.
UTAH CASE LAW
The genesis of Utah cases is State v. Bugger, 483 P2nd 442 (Utah 1971). There
the Court found that the defendant, who was found asleep in an automobile parked on the
shoulder of the road with the engine off, was not in actual physical control of the vehicle.
The decision was that:
(1) The Defendant was not seated in the vehicle on the traveled portion of the
highway;
(2) The Defendant was not attempting to steer, break or move the vehicle; and
(3) The vehicle's engine was not running.
No Utah Court has overruled the holding of State v. Bugger.
In Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P2nd 87 (Utah App. 1990), the Court took care
to distinguish State v. Bugger. In Richfield City v. Walker, the Court noted certain
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The Garcia v. Schwendiman Court held that a passenger or a passive occupant as
in Bugger, supra, would not be in actual physical control.
The Utah Courts have failed to address the issue here of 'inoperable vehicle' but
the suggestion is that an inoperable vehicle is outside the definition of actual physical
control. The Richfield v. Walker decision placed key emphasis on the defendants
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle. Here there was no ability to start and move
the car.
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986), Lopez Court compared
State v. Buzzer where the driver of the vehicle had parked his car completely off the road,
had turned off the motor, and was sleeping. There the Court indicated that the driver was
not in the driver's seat at the time he was found and arrested. The Court noted that
positioning in the driver's seat is an element common to all of the cases that have found
actual physical control of a motionless vehicle. The Lopez Court found that courts
upholding convictions in these and similar fact situations start out from the premise that
as long as a person is physically able to assert dominion by starting the car and driving
away, he has substantially as much control over the vehicle as he would if he were
actually driving it.

APPARENT ABILITY TO START AND MOVE THE VEHICLE

10
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apprehending them before they operate a vehicle, Garcia, 645
P.2d at 654; Lopez, 720 P.2d at 781; a person need not actually
move, or attempt to move, a vehicle, but only needs to have an
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle in order to be
in actual physical control Garcia, 645 P.2d at 654-55.
Defendant argues that fundamentally the accused must have the apparent ability to
start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control; this is an elementary
element to the definition of 'actual physical control.'. Throughout the various cases
within Utah, operability is a consistent theme.
OTHER JURISDICITONS
The definition employed by the Supreme Court of Montana has been widely
adopted:
"Using the term in 'actual physical control' in its composite sense, it means
"existing' or "present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or
regulation.'" State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958). Accord, Kansas
City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Ghylin, 250
N.W.2d 252, 254 (N.D. 1977); Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa. Super. 563, 327 A.2d 375, 383
1974); State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442, 443
(1971).
The Alabama Court in Key v. Kinsey, 424So.2d701, 703-04 (Ala. Crim. App.
1982) dealt with the accused's car out of gas and the keys with the defendant's son. The
son was walking to get gas. The Court found the defendant not to be in actual physical
control. They held the following elements to found for actual physical control:

1. Active or constructive possession of the
vehicle's ignition key by the person charged or, in
the alternative, proof that such a key is not
required for the vehicle's operation;
11
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2. Position of the person charged in the driver's
seat, behind the steering wheel, and in such
condition that, except for the intoxication, he or
she is physically capable of starting the engine and
causing the vehicle to move;
3. A vehicle that is operable to some extent. *
*This appears consistent with Garcia, Walker, Lopez.

The term actual physical control was construed by the Missouri courts in City of
Kansas City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo.App. 1976), as existing or present
bodily restraint directing influence, domination or regulation of the automobile. See also
State v. Liebhart 707 S.W.2d 427(Mo.App. 1986). In Bearden v. State, 430 P.2d 844,
845-47 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967), the Court found no actual physical control where the
defendant was found lying unconscious at the side of the road, outside his vehicle.
Defendant argues that if the vehicle has no apparent ability to be started and
move, the defendant cannot be in actual physical control. Here, the defendant could
neither start nor move the Blazer. It required a tow truck to remove it. Even once pulled
from the gorge, the Blazer would not start.

2. THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY RELATING THE
ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL' CONTRARY TO THE
APPELLATE COURT'S PRIOR DIRECTIVES. SUCH INSTRUCTION WAS
ERROR

12
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The defense and the prosecution both submitted jury instructions defining
'actual physical control' in accordance with Richfield City v. Walker, supra. These
instructions varied little. The defense requested the following instruction:
Instruction No.
In considering whether the defendant had actual physical control of vehicle, you
should consider the following factors:
(1) Whether the defendant was asleep or awake when discovered;
(2) The position of the automobile;
(3) Whether the automobile's motor was running;
(4) Whether the defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle;
(5) Whether the defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant;
(6) Whether the defendant had possession of the ignition key;
(7) Defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle;
(8) How the vehicle got to where it was found; and
(9) Whether the defendant drove it there.
These factors are not to be considered all-inclusive.
However, the trial court, over objection, gave the following instruction:
You are instructed that under Utah law an individual violates the provisions
of our Driving Under the Influence statute if the person is "driving" or " in actual
physical control" of a vehicle. "Driving" is the every-day definition as you may
understand it. It means "to urge forward under guidance, compel to go in a
particular direction or direct the course of. "
"Actual physical control" in its ordinary sense means existing or present
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation. You may consider
whether the defendant occupied the driver's position behind the steering wheel,
had possession of the ignition key, and the apparent ability to start and move the
vehicle in determining if the defendant was in actual physical control of the
vehicle.
Your are instructed to be in " actual physical control of a motor vehicle, " the
defendant need not be exercising conscious volition with regard to the vehicle and
the vehicle need not be in motion, so long as the defendant, of the defendants own
choice, was placed behind the wheel.

13
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Whether or not the vehicle's engine is running is not critical to the
determination of whether a person is in uphysical control" of the vehicle. A
person may be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle when the vehicle is
disabled if the problem from the vehicle arose from the act or behavior of the actor
and the jury can conclude that the disabling action is contemporaneous with the
intoxication of the Defendant. In other words, the focus of the jury determination
should not be narrowly upon the mechanical condition of the vehicle when it came
to rest, but upon the status of the Defendant and the nature of the authority he or
she exerted over the vehicle in arriving at the place from which, by virtue of its
inoperability, it can no longer move. Where circumstantial evidence permits a
legitimate inference that the vehicle was where it was and was performing as it
was because of the Defendant's choice, itfollows that the Defendant was in actual
physical control.

The trial court incorrectly stated the law. The law defining 'actual physical
control' has been set out and defined by Richfield City v. Walker and its predecessors.
No basis existed for any deviation from the holdings of Richfield City v. Walker.

DEGRADING THE BURDEN OF PROOF:
The trial court's instruction in part provides:
Where circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that the vehicle was
where it was and was performing as it was because of the Defendant's choice, it
follows that the Defendant was in actual physical control.
The instruction not only fails to properly define applicable law but it
downgraded the burden of proof from a standard of 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' to
the burden of a "legitimate inference \ The trial court's instruction in the last paragraph
allows the jury to find the defendant in 'actual physical control' when "circumstantial
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evidence permits a legitimate inference that the vehicle was where it was and was
performing as it was because of the Defendant's choice".
In State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held it
was error to advise the jury that they could presume the reasonable and ordinary
consequences of the defendant's acts. The instruction given there was as follows:
1. Purpose or knowledge, being states of mind, are
not always susceptible of proof by direct and
positive evidence and must ordinarily be inferred
from acts, conduct, statement, and circumstances.
The law presumes that a person intends the
reasonable and ordinary consequences of his own
acts.
(Emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court, citing the language of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). held that when intent is an element of the
crime charged, an instruction to the jury that "The law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" violates the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Utah Court adopted the language of Sandstrom
as follows:

First, a reasonable jury could well have
interpreted the presumption as "conclusive," that is,
not technically as a presumption at all, but rather
as an irrebuttable direction by the court to find
intent once convinced of the facts triggering the
presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have
interpreted the instruction as a direction to find
intent upon proof of the defendant's voluntary
15
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actions (and their "ordinary" consequences), unless
the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of
proof which may well have been considerably greater
than "some" evidence — thus effectively shifting the
burden of persuasion on the element of intent.

DIMINISHING THE MENTAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME
Trial court's instruction in part provides:
Your are instructed to be in " actual physical control of a motor vehicle, " the
defendant need not be exercising conscious volition with regard to the vehicle and
the vehicle need not be in motion, so long as the defendant, of the defendants own
choice, was placed behind the wheel

The trial court's instruction diminishes the mental element of the crime from a
'knowing and intentional' act mandated by U.C.A. 76-2-102 to 'less than conscious
volition' standard. Section 76-2-102 mandates that every offense not involving strict
liability requires a culpable mental state. Here, the trial court instructed the jury that the
act need not even be a conscious volition.
Further, the trial court's instruction suggests that it is enough for the defendant if
he is in the car behind the steering wheel. This runs contrary to every decision issued the
Utah Appellate Courts.
CONCLUSIONS
Here the car was inoperable. The defendant possessed no ability to get in the car,
start it and move. The officer had to enlist a tow truck to pull the car two hundred feet
out of the gorge. Even after pulling it out of the gorge, the tow truck driver could not start
the car.
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The officer had no knowledge of how the car got to this resting place. He had no
knowledge of the defendant's intoxicated state except for the 35 minutes between arrival
and arrest. He did not know how long the car had been at the location, whether that be
hours or days. He had no idea if the defendant was the driver of the car when it went off
road, and if he was the driver, if he was intoxicated
The defendant possessed no ability to move the car. By such definition, the
defendant was not in actual physical control of the car.
The trial court's jury instruction was not only inconsistent in its own verbiage but
contrary to current case law. It further diminished the burden of proof from 'reasonable
doubt' to a 'legitimate inference' standard. The instruction was further confusing and
inconsistent. It further allowed a conviction based on acts contrary to the Utah case law.

Dated this 1st day of April, 2001

^zZ^T7\t

Attorngy for AppelljfauDefendant
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of motion and order to extend time to file
appellant's brief to:
Attorney General for the State of Utah (four copies)
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Utah Court of Appeals (eighth copies)
450 South State
#500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Postage prepaid this
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day of April, 2003.

Addendum to Brief
(1) Defendant's Requested Instruction.
(2) Trial court's Instruction.

a)
Instruction NO.
In considering whether the defendant had actual physical control of vehicle, you
should consider the following factors:
(1) Whether the defendant was asleep or awake when discovered;
(2) The position of the automobile;
(3) Whether the automobile's motor was running;
(4) Whether the defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle;
(5) Whether the defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant;
(6) Whether the defendant had possession of the ignition key;
(7) Defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle;
(8) How the vehicle got to where it was found; and
(9) Whether the defendant drove it there.
These factors are not to be considered all-inclusive.

(2)

INSTRUCTION NO
You are instructed that under Utah law an individual violates the provisions of our Driving
Under the Influence statute if the person is "driving" or "in actual physical control" of a vehicle.
"Driving" is the every-day definition as you may understand it. It means "to urge forward under
guidance, compel to go in a particular direction or direct the course of."
"Actual ohvsical control" in its ordinary sense means existing or present bodily restraint,
directing influence, domination or regulation. You may consider whether the defendant occupied the
driver's position behind the steering wheel, had possession of the ignition key, and the apparent ability
to start and move the vehicle in determining if the defendant was in actual physical control of the
vehicle.
You are instructed that to be in "actual physical control of a motor vehicle," the defendant
need not be exercising conscious volition with regard to the vehicle, and the vehicle need not be in
motion, so long as the defendant, of the defendant's own choice, was placed behind the wheel
Whether or not the vehicle's engine is running is not critical to the determination of whether
a person is in "physical control" of the vehicle. A person may be in actual physical control of a
vehicle if that person is in the vehicle, behind the wheel. It is also possible for a person to be in
phy'sfcaTbotifrof of if fnotor vehicle when the vehicle is disabled if the problem from the vehicle arose
from the act or behavior of the actor and the jury can conclude that the disabling action is
(contemporaneous with the intoxication of the Defendant. In other words, the focus of the jury
determination should not be narrowly upon the mechanical condition of the vehicle when it came to
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rest, but upon the status of the Defendant and the nature of the authority he or she exerted over the
vehicle in arriving at the place from which, by virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move
Where circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that the vehicle was where it was and
was performing as it was because of the Defendant's choice, it follows that the Defendant was in
actual physical control
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